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THE UNFOLDING OF THE REAGAN ENERGY PROGRAM: THE FIRST YEAR 
OVERVIEW 
"Policy is a process as well as a product. It is used to refer to a 
process of decision-making and also to the product of that process." 1/ 
Both process and product have altered under the Reagan Administration; 
rather than developing a discrete Federal energy policy, the Reagan 
energy program, in contrast to that of the Carter Administration, is less 
comprehensive and perhaps more fragmentary. The Administration has pursued 
a course of transferring the locus of decision-making from the Federal 
Government to the States, to the private sector, and even to individuals. 
As stated by President Reagan, the Administration wants to remove 
Government intrusion in energy policy so "native American genius--not 
arbitrary federal policy--will be free to provide for our energy future." 2 /  - 
The absence of a comprehensive policy framework should not obscure 
the significance of the Reagan energy program. It is more than the 
abdication of energy decision-making prerogatives vested in recent years 
in the Federal Government. It marks a de-emphasis on energy as a problem 
that commands a discrete policy, and a determination that energy policy 
shall instead be servant to broader economic objectives and philosophies. 
11 Wildavsky, Aaron. Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of 
policy Analysis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. p. 387. 
2 /  President Reagan. Nuclear Policy Statement. October 8, 1981. - 
This departure from the energy policy articulated by the Carter 
Administration reflects an economic philosophy that reaches into many 
areas of Government activity. If so, one should weigh the consistency 
of policy and budgetary decisions with those principles. Through such an 
assessment, other objectives which may also be governing the Reagan 
energy policy can be identified. 
ENERGY POLICY AS PHILOSOPHY: THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN (NEP 111) 
In July 1981, the Reagan Administration unveiled its national energy 
plan. Required by Congress every two years, many had hoped that NEP I11 
would provide the country and the Congress with specifics regarding the 
Administration's view towards issues such as natural gas decontrol, the 
clean air act, and emergency preparedness. However, rather than outline a 
plan of legislative action, the Administration's "Securing America's Energy 
Future: The National Energy Policy Plan" (hereafter referred to as NEP-111) 
is a statement of economic philosophy: 
The Administration's reformulation of policies affecting 
energy is part of the President's comprehensive Program for 
Economic Recovery, which includes elimination of excessive Fed- 
eral spending and taxes, regulatory relief, and a sound monetary 
policy. When fully implemented, the Economic Recovery Program 
will release the strength of the private sector and ensure a 
vigorous economic climate in which the Nation's problems, in- 
cluding energy problems, will be solved primarily by the Ameri- 
can people themselves--consumers, workers, managers, inventors, 
and investors. 3-1 
The energy problem has been characterized as an interlocking network 
of contradictory concerns, including national security, the economy, equity 
and, resource conservation and the environment. Previous administrations 
have presented energy "packages" designed to meet the objective of reducing oil 
imports, but with "due" concern for the other facets of energy policy. 
For example, in NEP I, President Carter delineated principles which established 
the context for his energy policy. These included: 
1. Healthy economic growth must continue. 
2. National policies for the protection of the environment must be 
maintained. 
31 U . S .  Department of Energy. "Securing America's Energy Future: The 
~ational Energy Policy Plan." page 3. 
3 .  The United States must reduce its vulnerability to potentially 
devastating supply interruptions. 
4 .  The United States must solve its energy problems in a manner that 
is equitable to all regions, sectors and income groups. 4-1 
The Reagan Administration approaches energy policy from an economic 
perspective, deemphasizing energy as an special or unique issue requiring 
special consideration. This deemphasis on energy policy is manifested by 
a reduced role for the Federal Government. As stated in NEP 111: 
Public spending for energy-related purposes is secondary to 
ensuring that the private sector can respond to market realities. 
Even then, Federal spending should be considered only in those 
promising areas of energy production and use where the private 
sector is unlikely to invest ....[ Ulsing public funds to subsidize 
either domestic energy production or conservation buys little addi- 
tional security and only diverts capital, workers, and initiative 
from uses that contribute more to society and the economy. 5-1 
Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration does not see 
the role of Government as designing an "energy future", balancing competing 
interests, or leading the country towards a energy transition. As stated 
in NEP 111: 
Quantitative levels for the production, the consumption, or 
even the importation of energy in its various forms are not 
objectives in themselves. The American economy will choose the 
energy consumption for a strong, productive, and secure society 
in the year 2000 whether it be 80 quads or 100 quads or 120 quads 
of energy annually .... Fundamentally, however, the best guarantee 
of maintaining a wholesome balance among competing interests in 
regards to energy lies in allowing the American people themselves 
to make free and fully informed choices. 51 
4 1  Executive Office of the President, Energy Policy and Planning. The - 
National Energy Plan. pages 26 -27 .  
5 1  Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The National 
~ n e r ~ y  Policy Plan. pages 3-4 .  
6 1  Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The National 
~ n e r ~ y  Policy Plan. pages 3-4 .  
This move to deemphasize energy as a policy issue and Government's in- 
volvement with the issue is a fundamental change from energy policies of the 
recent past. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 focused national attention on de- 
veloping an explicit Federal energy policy. Oil shortages during the summer 
of 1973 prompted allusions in public statements by President Nixon to energy 
"self-sufficiency," a concept elevated to program status as "Energy Indepen- 
dence" after the onset of the Arab oil embargo. 
Let us set as our national goal in the spirit of Apollo, with 
the determination of the Manhattan Project, that by the end of 
this decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own 
energy neeeds without depending on any foreign energy sources. L/ 
In a subsequent radio address on the energy situation, President Nixon con- 
cluded by saying that "where energy is concerned, we, the American people, 
shall be the sole masters of our fate." - 81 
The policy response included the establishment of emergency authorities 
to address immediate shortages, and the infusion of Federal money into longer- 
term research and development. The year 1974 was a banner one for research and 
development: for solar heating and cooling (P.L. 93-473), geothermal energy 
( P . L .  93-410), electric and hybrid vehicle research (P.L. 94-413), among others. 
Federal spending for alternative energy research and development increased 
in subsequent years. Price and allocation controls remained on crude oil and 
some petroleum products, particularly gasoline; price controls remained on nat- 
ural gas. Shortly before leaving office, President Ford characterized the con- 
tinuing dispute over energy policy during his term as resulting from "differing 
71 Nixon, President Richard M. Address on the Energy Emergency. November 
7, 1973. Appearing in: U.S . Congress. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 
Executive Energy Documents. July 1978, Publication No. 95-114. 95th Congress, 
2d session. p. 86. 
8/ Ibid., p. 118. Address given January 19, 1974. - 
views as to the appropriate role of the Federal Government." The President 
maintained that the primary responsibility for energy should "continue to 
rest with the private sector," and warned against thoughtless expansion 
of the Federal role. 91 - 
However, the National Energy Plan submitted by President Carter to 
Congress in April 1977, proposed to vigorously expand the Federal role in 
energy policy. As its first principle, the plan stated that "...the energy 
problem can be effectively addressed only by a Government that accepts re- 
sponsibility for dealing with it comprehensively." g/ In part, President 
Carter proposed to use authorities established by prior enactments. How- 
ever, the National Energy Act extended Federal authorities to govern energy 
decision-making by industry, institutions and individuals in several areas. 
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (P.L. 95-620) established author- 
ities whereby the Federal Government can require electric powerplants and 
major fuel-burning installations to utilize energy sources other than natural 
gas or petroleum. The Natural Gas Policy Act (P.L. 95-621), while it provided 
for the eventual deregulation of most categories of natural gas, placed 31-2- 
viously unregulated intrastate gas under regulation. The Energy Tax Act 
(P.L. 95-618) established an excise tax on the purchase of fuel-inefficient 
cars. 
This trend and the philosophy behind it are repudiated by the Reagan 
approach to energy policy. Essentially, the Reagan approach is a philosoph- 
ical return to the "old-time religion" that characterized energy policy 
before 1973. It is a return to an implicit energy policy where the locus 
9/ Ibid., p. 356. - 
101 See: U.S. Congress. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Tbe 
~ r e s z e n t  's Energy Program. Hay 1977. Publication No. 95-16. p. 96. 
of decision-making is vested in the private sector and in the marketplace 
which makes all decisions governing which fuels, in what volume, in what 
mix, at what price, and for what purposes are produced. The role of the 
Federal Government in energy is distinctly subordinate to decision-making 
in the private sector. 111 -
The Reagan economic philosophy as applied to energy policy and ex- 
plained in NEP 111 raises several significant policy issues. Among the 
more important ones presented in NEP 111 are the following: 
1. Reducing oil imports should not be the driving force for 
U.S. energy policy. The needs of the economy as dictated by 
the marketplace should control the importation of oil as any 
other decision would be economically inefficient. 
2. Energy consumption has no normative content. Whether the coun- 
try choses to use 80, 100, or 120 quads a year in energy is 
irrelevent as long as the economy is sound. 
3. The principal role of the federal government is to increase 
energy supply through leasing, promoting nuclear power, ec- 
onomic incentives, long-term R and D ,  and reducing regulation. 
4. Equity is not a concern of energy policy. Although the poor 
may suffer, distorting the marketplace will hinder an economic 
recovery program designed to help all Americans, including 
the poor. 
5. Government planning is counterproductive to energy policy. 
Government does not have the insight or knowledge to guide 
energy policy. Policy should be determined by the marketplace 
in response to circumstances as they arise. 
Reducing oil imports has been a continuing theme in energy policy since 
the 1973 oil embargo. From "Project Independence" to the "Moral Equivalent 
of War," Presidents have used the national security aspect of energy policy 
to justify their proposed energy policies. Most recently, the national 
11/ U.S. Congress. House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and 
interstate and Foreign Commerce. Gulick, Frances A. , David Gushee, and 
Warren H. Donnelly. Overview Commentary on the President's National Energy 
Plan. November 1977. p. 16. 
security argument was employed to enact an $88 billion synthetic fuels 
effort. 121 As stated by the Congress in the Energy Security Act: -
The purpose of this title, and the amendments made by this title, 
are to utilize to the fullest extent the constitutional powers of 
the Congress to improve the Nation's balance of payments, reduce 
the threat of economic disruption from oil supply interruptions and 
increase the Nation's security by reducing its dependence upon 
imported oil. - 131 
The Reagan Administration feels that such an all-out effort to reduce 
oil imports is economically inefficient and will not significantly decrease 
U.S vulnerability to oil disruptions. Reducing oil imports "at any cost is 
not a major criterion for the Nation's energy security and economic health." - 14/ 
To the extent that imported oil is overpriced vis-a-vis domestic alternatives, 
it will be replaced by market forces in search of the cheapest form of energy. 
The Administration attributes part of the current downward movement in oil 
imports to the economy making these types of adjustments. During disrupt- 
ions disruptions, primary reliance should remain with the market to allocate 
supply supplemented by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and private stocks. 
Such a philosophy disturbs some who feel the approach ignores the com- 
plexity of the market and historic consumer behavior. Critics of a strict 
free market approach argue that social and institutional variables can frus- 
trate the selection of economically efficient alternatives. For example, 
the Administration believes that market economics is sufficient to spur 
conservation. Yet, in situations where individuals rent their residences 
121 For a discussion of the debate on title 1 of the Energy Security Act, 
see ~ Z k e r ,  Larry and Paul Rothberg. In Energy Initiatives of the 96th 
Congress (forthcoming committee print). 
131 P.L. 96-294, sec 100(b)(l). -
141 Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The National 
~nerg>olic~ Plan, page 2 .  
or commercial space, neither the tenant nor the building owner may have an 
incentive to save energy. Tenants have no incentive to make energy conser- 
vation improvements on buildings they do not own, and owners have little in- 
centive to make improvements if the tenants are paying the bill. g/ 
A second concern of critics is that an energy policy which bases de- 
cisions about oil consumption primarily on the basis of economic "rationality" 
may ignore interests of national security in reducing the nation's dependence 
upon imported petroleum. This concern is heightened by the near-term stabili- 
zation of oil prices, and the otherwise welcome prospect that OPEC may soon 
agree upon a long-term pricing strategy that will lend some predictability 
to prices for several years to come. If price stabilizes over a period of 
time as it did in the mid-to-late 1970s, consumers will become less sensitive 
to the need to conserve oil and less inclined to convert from oil to other 
fuels. 
Differences in energy policy between the Reagan and Carter Adminis- 
trations are also explained by a conflict in social values and outlook. 
During his Administration, President Carter hinted that many Americans were 
profligate and consumed more energy than was necessary to maintain comfort 
and a reasonable quality of life. What was novel in President Carter's pro- 
nouncement was its "ascetic" flavor. The Carter Administration suggested 
that Americans were to lower their expectations and consume less energy--not 
only because it would save money, but because the Nation would be morally 
15/ For other institutional barriers, see Carl Blumstein, "Social and 
1nstiGtional Barriers to Energy Conservation. " In Forecast--Volume 11: 
Energy Conservation in Cities, by the Congressional Research Service, 
December 1978, committee print for the House Committee on Science and Tech- 
nology, 95th Congress, 2nd session. 
richer for doing so. In his address to the 
ident Carter observed, "I think most of you 
not ask for changes or sacrifices would not 
late date....I have faith that meeting this 
even richer." 161 -
The Reagan Administration rejects this 
sumption. Energy consumption per se has no 
Nation on April 18, 1977, Pres- 
realize that a policy which does 
be an effective policy at this 
challenge will make our own lives 
moralistic view of energy con- 
normative content. Rather, a 
growing economy is the object of Administration policy. Economic growth 
is the social value of concern to the Reagan Administration, not energy 
consumption. E/ To the extent energy facilitates economic growth, it is 
important. But the economy should choose the appropriate consumption 
level, not Government. 
Critics of this approach to energy consumption attack either the social 
value on which it is based (economic growth), or the method of execution 
(market economics), or both. Nurtured by the affluence and the anticompetitive 
values of the 1960s, offshoots of the environmental movement have expanded 
their concern for growth to a broad spectrum of human activities: population, 
energy and resource consumption, and even economic growth as it is currently 
measured. The finite limits of global resources and environmental equilibrium 
are perceived to be dangerously near by these "limits to growth" advocates. 
Hence, they feel the country should de-emphasize a materialistic definition 
of life as exemplified by economic growth, and concern itself with other 
human and environmental issues. 
1 6 1  Executive Energy Documents, op. cit., p. 391. - 
1 7 1  For a discussion of social values and energy policy, see Behrens, - 
Carl. "National Goals and Social Values in Energy Policy. " In U.S. Energy 
Outlook: A Demand Perspective for the Eighties. July 1981, committee print 
for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
Proponents of the limits to growth approach, as well as other critics 
of traditional energy sources, 181 attack the so-called free market approach 
as naive, noting that the market is biased in favor of traditional fuels 
through Government subsides and the financial markets. As stated by 
S. David Freeman, Director of TVA: 
As it is, market forces are heavily tilted in favor of energy 
production and against conservation.... The production organizations 
have access to capital on terms that would be the envy of the average 
energy consumer. Investments in electric power plants, coal mines, 
and petroleum production are traditionally made in large amounts, 
in the expectation of a long-term payout. And these organizations 
are not in the business of conserving energy. The oil companies 
now talk about conserving, but they are in the business of selling 
petroleum. As for the utilities, they until very recently were 
forbidden to invest in energy conserving equipment for their 
consumers, even though it has been in their economic interest to 
do so for the better part of a decade....The market bias against 
conservation is even more pronounced on the consuming end. 191 
However, the emphasis of the new administration is on energy production. 
As stated in NEP 111: "Sound public [energy] policies must be based on recog- 
nition of the Government's and the private sector's respective roles in energy 
production. The Federal Government's most direct impact on America's energy 
future arises from its position as the steward of the Outer Continental Shelf 
and ... publicly controlled land, ...." -- 201 To assist private enterprise in 
exploiting the country's natural resources, the Reagan Administration is com- 
mitted to reducing regulation and facilitating access to public lands. Also, 
181 Some critics of traditional energy sources, such as Amory B. 
~ o v i n x  have denied their allegiance to the limits to growth thesis. For 
a discussion of the soft path and its relationship to the limits to growth 
thesis, see Behrens, op. cit., p. 455. 
191 Statement of S. David Freeman, Director, Tennesse Valley Authority, 
bef orFthe Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes, 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. July 21, 1981. 
201 Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The National 
~ n e r ~ c o l i c ~  Plan. page 1. 
the Administration intends to revitalize the nuclear option, including 
the breeder, along with emphasis on long-term, high-risk, research 
and development. 
Critics believe that the emphasis on energy supply is misplaced: 
that conservation is the quickest and cheapest way to meet the country's 
energy problem. It is conservation, not increased energy supply, which 
has brought oil imports down to their current level, and proponents of 
conservation believe that active Federal support for conservation could 
accelerate this trend. 
A second concern of conservation proponents is equity. The poor 
face immmediate problems regarding energy costs for essential needs such 
as heating and transportation. This problem is exacerbated by the Reagan 
Administration's policy of using prices to spur conservation. Also, the 
Administration's primary device to encourage conservation--tax credits-- 
are of little use to poor people. Hence, an active Government role in 
protecting low income families from rising energy prices is considered 
essential. 
The Administration agrees that the poor may suffer disproportionately 
because of rising energy prices. However, the Administration believes that 
the best way to help the poor is to restore the economy through free markets 
and the private sector. Therefore, the Administration feels the energy mar- 
kets should not be distorted to assist low-income groups. Rather, their 
needs should be addressed by the Administration's overall social policy, 
particularly through block grants to the States. 
This reliance on the market to direct policy is the backbone of the 
Reagan approach to energy policy. As stated in NEP 111: 
Computers cannot gauge human response to future situations with 
precision. This is the key explanation of why projections of future 
energy consumption and production have been so often wrong, although 
there has also been a general bias against market flexibility in the 
assumptions of many models. Increased reliance on market decisions 
offers a continuing national referendum which is a far better 
means of charting the Nation's energy path than stubborn reliance 
on government dictates or on a combination of subsidies and regu- 
lations. 211 -
This perception dictates minimum Federal involvement in energy policy- 
making, a distinguishing characteristic of energy policy before the oil embar- 
go of 1973-74. In its reassertion of this principle, the Reagan Administration 
has repudiated the direction which energy policy has taken since the embargo. 
To the Reagan Administration, the sweeping changes in energy policy, price 
and politics subsequent to the embargo did not alter the appropriateness of 
the marketplace, with minimal Federal intervention, to address national energy 
problems. Indeed, the Reagan Administration, often citing the experience 
with petroleum price and allocation regulations, has strongly argued that 
the centralization of energy decision-making within the Federal Government 
compounded the problem. 
The discussion below outlines the new Administration's approach to 
several major energy sources and policy issues, the initiatives presented 
by the Administration, congressional response, and an assessment. 
211 Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The National 
~ n e r ~ c o l i c ~  Plan. July, 1981. page 2. 

OIL 
Within days of its accession to power, the Reagan Administration, 
meeting the promise of?its frequent campaign vow to reduce Federal energy 
regulation, exempted gasoline and crude oil from price and allocation 
controls effective January 28, 1981. The decontrol action was an early 
bellwether of the Administration's economic and political philosophy. 
As is expressed in NEP-111, the marketplace "offers a continuing national 
referendum" on charting the Nation's energy future, and is far preferable 
to "stubborn reliance on government dictates or...subsidies and regu- 
lations." c/ 
The role of markets captures only part of the significance of decontrol. 
The decision to decontrol oil symbolizes the Administration's fundamental 
premise that energy is no longer a discrete problem, but a policy issue to 
be treated as part of an overall economic recovery program. "The challenge 
ahead," notes NEP-111, "is to provide a healthy economy and policy environment 
that enables .... rational energy production and consumption decisions. .." - 23/ 
The possible dismantling of the Department of Energy (not to mention the com- 
paratively modest length of NEP-I11 itself) is a further reflection of the 
re-ordering of energy's position in the policy hierarchy. 
Prior to the decontrol decision, oil decontrol was typically perceived 
as a policy which would promote more efficient use of petroleum and lower 
its consumption, even if one challenged claims made for the increased pro- 
duction promised by proponents of decontrol. Indeed, the Reagan Admini- 
stration holds optimistic expectations from the increased investment 
2 2 1  NEP-111, op. cit. , p. 1. - --- 
2 3 1  Ibid. - -
within the exploration, production, and refining segments of the industry 
which the Administration suggests that decontrol has encouraged. 
However, decontrol is not the sole feature of the Administration's 
oil pricing policy. The Administration strongly notes in NEP-I11 that 
the decision to no longer subsidize petroleum consumption must be coupled 
with a decision to not subsidize its substitutes. 
By subsidizing energy costs through price controls, energy policy was 
social policy, the Administration reasons. By supporting research and 
development in demonstrated technologies for petroleum substitutes that 
were not economically competitive, energy policy incurred costs to the 
Government incommensurate with the national security benefits on which 
the expenditures have been justified. Both policies, the Reagan Administra- 
tion contends, were inconsistent with rational economic policy. 
Rational market decisions should reflect "the true value, in every 
sense, of all the Nation's resources," the Administration notes in NEP-111. 
Imported oil may be less expensive in some instances than substitute 
fuels, and while 
efficient displacement of imported oil is an important 
objective, achieving a low level of U.S. oil imports - 
at any cost is not a major criterion for the Nation's 
energy security and economic health. - 2 4 1  -. 
(emphasis in original) 
It was error to subsidize the price of imported petroleum, the Reagan 
Administration argues; it would be equally inappropriate "if market forces 
were distorted through indiscriminate subsidies for alternatives that 
cost more than imported oil." The key word is "indiscriminatew--instances 
in which the potential alternatives "offer no short-term to medium likeli- 
hood of being economically competitive." 
In short, the Administration's oil pricing policy is more than just 
a reassertion of markets. Oil pricing policy aptly reflects the manner 
in which the Administration has de-emphasized energy policy, asserting 
that energy policy should serve economic goals instead of subordinating 
economic objectives to energy policy, or masking social welfare and 
defense policies as energy policies. 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
On September 30, 1981, the authority delegated by Congress to the Presi- 
dent in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 to impose comprehensive 
price and allocation controls expired. During the first session of the 97th 
Congress, a number of bills were introduced to restore this authority, pro- 
vide for dispersal of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, or institute a revenue 
recycling mechanism for insulating consumers from the economic shocks that 
would likely accompany a shortage of petroleum products. 
The Administration has expressed unqualified opposition to the ex- 
tension of price and allocation controls, and any Federal intervention in 
the marketplace during petroleum shortages. In the event of shortage, the 
Administration proposes: (1) maximum reliance on the free market to determine 
the price and allocation of energy supplies, and ( 2 )  full participation in 
the international oil-sharing program of the International Energy Agency. 
In the meantime, the Administration supports rapid growth of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve, and seeking measures to encourage stock buildups in the 
private sector during times when supply is secure. 
The Administration believes there is no necessity for or practicality in 
articulating an emergency response plan in advance of a disruption; the ap- 
propriate action will be undertaken as warranted should an emergency occur. 
The Administration is opposed to controls, and contends that the mere estab- 
lishement of authority to impose them sends an inappropriate signal to the 
private sector that it may possibly count upon Federal intervention to protect 
its access to crude or products during a shortage. 
While it appears that most Members of Congress believe that price and 
allocation controls were largely ineffective and inefficient, their opposition 
to controls is not so absolute as the Administration's. The major congress- 
ional initiative has been S. 1503, the Standby Petroleum Allocation Act of 
1981, introduced by Senator McClure, and passed by the Senate on October 29, 
1981. 
Recognizing that there would be little hope that the President would 
sign a bill "loaded" with mandatory directives to the President or provisions 
establishing priority allocation to certain users, the bill was intended 
simply to provide the President with discretionary authority to allocate 
crude and products in the event of a serious shortfall. 
Nonetheless, the bill was besieged in committee with a number of admend- 
ments, and to forestall lengthy and acrimonious debate, the committee 
agreed to incorporate language from the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
of 1973 (EPAA) establishing that the standby regulations would provide for the 
protection of certain users and uses of crude and petroleum products. The 
legislation, as passed by the Senate, would permit the President to implement 
standby crude or product allocation regulations in the event of a serious 
shortage or to meet U.S. obligations to the International Energy Agency. The 
regulations would be in effect ninety days, if neither House of Congress 
disapproves, and could be extended another sixty days without congressional 
review. Price controls are provided for if necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the allocation regulations. The bill also includes language that preserves 
the Federal prerogative to determine when, and in what manner, petroleum may 
be subject to price and allocation controls, but provides that areas of regula- 
tory activity not assumed by the Federal Government during an emergency could 
be undertaken by the States. Comparable legislation has been considered in the 
House. 
A confrontation between the Administration and Congress may be looming, 
centering around the ~dministration's most basic faith in free markets and 
decentralization. Many in Congress appear to agree with the Administration 
that one cannot make specific provisions for shortages of unknown duration 
and character, but are skeptical that the free market would function swiftly 
enough under all circumstances to provide for critical needs. In introducing 
S. 1503, Senator McClure observed that "we cannot resposibily be dependent on 
anything less than full preparation after expiration of EPAA," and that the 
Administration must be fully prepared "should federal action become necessary 
to supplement the market mechanism." 
However, the proposed bills do not require the Administration to specify 
the precise actions to be taken under particular circumstances. The standby 
regulations that the Administration would be required to develop might be 
imprecisely worded while still complying with the requirements of either the 
House or Senate legislation. Development of implementing regulations could be 
postponed until the onset of an actual emergency, preserving the latitude 
upon which the Administration insists. Given these considerations, and the 
likely strength of the congressional consensus, the Administration may decide 
this issue is not worth the fight--and possible defeat. 

NATURAL GAS 
Not long after decontrolling petroleum, the Reagan Administration 
hinted its intention to seek early decontrol of natural gas. The Pres- 
ident's Energy Policy Task Force report, prepared and released in Decem- 
ber 1980, urged "phased decontrol ... notwithstanding present 'decontrol' 
legislation," a reference to the Natural Gas Policy Act. 
The text on natural gas, which is one of the shortest passages in 
the fuel-specific section of NEP-111 observes that important premises of 
the Natural Gas Policy Act (P.L. 95-621) have been "overturned" by subse- 
quent events: (1) the price of oil has more than doubled beyond what it 
was projected to rise to in 1985 by the NGPA; and (2) because of this 
widening disparity, natural gas resources are not being properly exploited 
because there is less incentive to explore for gas than for oil. 
As a matter of economic principle for the Administration, decontrol 
of natural gas should be a straightforward matter. But politically--and 
even economically--it is not. The deliberation over the Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 was exhausting, sustained on the hope that Congress would not 
need to address the issue for several years. The Administration and Mem- 
bers of Congress with special interest in natural gas decontrol recognize 
how little appetite either party would have for a major confrontation. It 
can be expected, then, that any major proposal introduced in the 97th Con- 
gress will be further along the path of consensus than was the Natural Gas 
Policy Act in its original form. 
If consistent with the economic philosophy of the Reagan Administra- 
tion, decontrol would be inconsistent with its economic policy. Though 
the impact would be difficult to calculate and would vary with the spe- 
cifics of policy, decontrol would certainly contribute to inflation and 
would offset some of the tax reductions that were described as fundamental 
to the Administration's program. Most importantly, any significant de- 
control measure might not survive congressional consideration without pass- 
age of a windfall profits tax, which the President, in a now celebrated 
note to Representative Glenn English has said he would oppose. Windfall 
profits taxes are, to the Administration, archetypical instances of "burden- 
some" Federal policies which discourage private sector initiative. How- 
ever, the Reagan Administration has been held captive by the windfall pro- 
fits tax on oil--for obvious political reasons--made somewhat less dis- 
tasteful by the helpful budget-balancing revenues it provides. Some spec- 
ulate that natural gas decontrol accompanied by a windfall profits tax 
might commend itself to the Administration for the same reason, but the 
initiative for a windfall profits tax would clearly be left to the Congress. 
For the moment, natural gas decontrol continues to be the object of 
various studies, position papers and discussion. The debate will center 
about determining what categories (and, therefore, what volumes) of gas 
should be decontrolled; and whether some categories of gas are decon- 
trolled immediately or subject to phased decontrol. If the latter, an 
additional issue will be deciding what the "target" uncontrolled price 
should be. 
One concern about decontrolling gas is that rising gas prices could 
prompt industrial and utility users to switch to oil. This would be 
inconsistent with the avowed national policy goal of reducing oil imports 
(albeit, not at any cost); the equivalent cost for residual fuel oil has 
been suggested as a possible "target" price to avoid oil displacing gas 
consumption. 
The President's Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environ- 
ment was reportedly pressing for the President to reach some decision on 
accelerating gas price decontrol by late September or early October 1981, 
but preoccupation with the second round of budget cuts and the proposed 
dismantling of the Department of Energy has postponed release of the Admin- 
istration's proposal until early 1982. Enactment of legislation to acceler- 
ate natural gas decontrol may be a strong possibility in 1982. Only the 
particulars remain to be worked out, an "only" premised upon hopes by Con- 
gress, the Administration and the industry that achieveing consensus will 
be less painful the second time around. 

COAL 
The Administration appears confident that market conditions favor coal 
development provided the Government gets out of the way. This confidence 
is resulting in new proposals both to promote production of coal and removing 
existing direct subsidies and regulations which promote production. The Ad- 
ministration is acting to encourage exploration and production on Federal 
lands, to change the Clean Air Act, and to reduce Federal regulations of land 
reclamation. The Administration also has succeeded in repealing the "off 
gas" provision of the Fuel Use Act, and has sought a reduction in coal Research 
and Development and synthetic fuels efforts. 
This more laissez-faire attitude towards coal differs from that of the 
Carter Administration, which set ambitious production goals for coal-one bil- 
lion tons annually by 1985. As proposed by President Carter, the expansion 
was to be induced by a combination of tax and regulatory measures. 251 Taxes 
would have been used to raise the cost of industrial use of oil and gas and 
encourage conversion to coal. A regulatory program was enacted to prohibit 
new oil- and natural gas-fired boilers with some exceptions, and to phase out 
existing natural gas boilers by 1990. Also, strict environmental regulations 
would have been enacted to protect the air and reclaim disrupted land. 
The Administration hopes to replace this partially enacted regulatory 
system with a market system to encourage coal. The decision to decontrol oil 
raises the cost of one competitor to coal--residual fuel oil. However, nat- 
ural gas is still under controls; complete decontrol would require congress- 
ional action. With the repeal of the "off gas" provision of the Fuel Use Act, 
251  See National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the President, Energy 
policyand Planning, 1977. 
industrial consumption of natural gas may increase at the expense of coal 
unless natural gas decontrol occurs in the near future or environmental regu- 
lations are altered. 
To improve coal's attractiveness to private industry, the Administration 
is recommending changes in the Federal reclamation laws and the Clean Air 
Act. Believing the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) has promulgated regulations 
far in excess of the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act, Secretary Watt has recommended major changes in the Federal guidelines 
for surface reclamation. The crux of the new proposals involves replacing 
the current "design standards" with "performance standards" which the States 
would enforce. The purpose is to increase flexibility in restoring disturbed 
lands and return primary responsibility for enforcement back to the States. 
However, the Administration may be trading flexibility for uncertainty. 
Although rigid and detailed, the current regulations have been fully tested 
in court and provide a known regulatory regime. New proposals, particularly 
of the variety the Administration is proposing, would probably face court 
challenges both on substantive grounds and on the legality of Secretary Watt's 
intepretation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Such changes 
would also invoke some Congressional opposition. This legal and legislative 
turmoil may arrive just as coal developers are becoming familiar to the current 
rules, and delay the supply-side response the Administration is trying to 
encourage. 
The Administration also has indicated it wishes to relax environmental 
regulation. In particular, the Administration has suggested elimination of 
the "technology standard" mandating a percentage reduction of sulfur dioxide in 
power plants regardless of the emission level. In its place the Administration 
would impose a "performance standard" mandating an upper limit on permissible 
emission levels. This would provide plant developers flexibility in meeting 
the standard, either through low-sulfur coal, or emission control technology. 
A performance standard would encourage the use of western low-sulfur 
coal as an less expensive alternative to scrubbers in meeting a performance 
standard. Generally, western coal-producing States are in a boom situation 
with their low-sulfur coal. However, because of the States' small populations, 
the technology involved (strip-mining), and the rapid nature of the growth, 
these States are struggling to control the situation. This contrasts with 
some eastern States which currently have idle mining capacity and unemployment 
problems. A performance standard would increase the competitive advantage 
western States have in the midwest and southwest, to the detriment of eastern 
coal States. Such a situation could arguably exacerbate the growth-related 
problems of western States, and the contraction problems of eastern States. 
Also, depending on the emission limit set, a performance standard 
might increase the aggregate amount of SO2 emitted. Such an increase, or 
the possibility of an increase, could strain relations with Canada regarding 
acid rain. Power plant emissions are generally regarded as a major contrib- 
utor to acid rain 261 and the Canadian Government feels the United States must -
act to control such emissions which are affecting parts of eastern Canada. 
How the Canadians would perceive changes in the Clean Air Act is unclear. 
In summary, the focus of the Administration's action in coal is to 
provide a more flexible regulatory environment for coal exploitation and 
development. However, such efforts will not provide relief to the coal 
industry in the short term, and may in fact increase regulatory uncertainty. 
261 See National Research Council, Committee on the Atmosphere and ~iosphere's 
reporton the burning of fossil fuels, September 1981. 

SYNTHETIC FUELS DEVELOPMENT 
During the debate on the Energy Security Act (P.L. 96-294), the prin- 
cipal argument of proponents for Government assistance to synthetic fuels 
efforts was national security. The potential economic inefficiency of inves- 
ting in synthetic fuels plants as opposed to other sources was overridden 
during debate by the security issue. 
For the Administration, synthetic fuels represent a dilemma. Although 
synthetic fuels could assist in reducing oil imports, the uncertainties con- 
cerning their development may deter private industry from taking the risks 
without Government assistance. Also, it may be more economically efficient 
to put that money into other, more near-term, cost-effective technologies. 
In NEP 111, the Administration states that oil imports should be reduced only 
to the extent that it is economic to do so. With the philosophy of the Admin- 
istration, private industry is the appropriate sector to make this decision, 
not the Government. 
The Administration has proposed shifting the focus of Government synfuels 
programs to the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation. Such a move is designed 
to increase the influence of market forces in synthetic fuel development, 
while assisting industry in coping with the expensive learning process that 
development of synthetic fuels will require. In line with this belief, the 
Administration called for the elimination of the DOE demostration programs, 
including SRC I and SRC I1 (the latter being built under an international 
agreement with West Germany and Japan). Also, the Administration recommended 
drastic reductions in synthetic fuels research and development. The proposed 
FY82 budget cut R and D for coal liquefaction from $886.3 million to $105.2 
million, surface gasification from $216.4 million to $53.4 million, and in 
situ coal gasification from $10.5 million to $8.3 million. 

NUCLEAR 
After 4  years of being considered an energy source of "last resort" by 
the Carter Administration, nuclear power is now regarded as a potentially 
large and long-term contributor to the national energy mix. The Carter 
Administration looked on uranium as an important fuel in the near term, but 
viewed it as a transition to long-term renewable energy sources. The Reagan 
Administration, however, views fission as an "essentially inexhaustible energy 
supply." As a result, the development and demonstration of breeder reactor 
technology, which the Carter Administration had deferred and deemphasized, 
is considered essential. The total FY82 Reagan nuclear budget request was 
$1.054 million, compared with $813 million from the previous Administration. 
The primary source of this increase was the decision to fund the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor project (CRBR), which President Carter omitted in his FY82 
request. 
It is the Reagan Administration's decision to fund Clinch River which 
has raised the most controversy in the Congress regarding nuclear policy. 
Noting the Administration's decision to recommend elimination of solar, alcohol, 
and coal synthetic fuels demonstration programs by stating such projects should 
be developed by private enterprise, opponents have suggested the same rationale 
be consistently applied to Clinch River. However, the Administration decided 
that breeder development was "outside the range of normal industry risk-taking" 
and thus merits Government support. As with the coal synthetic fuels demonstra- 
tion program, the controversy over Clinch River illustrates the apparently am- 
biguous nature of the "long-term, high risk" criteria employed by the Adminis- 
tration in making research and development decisions, and the ability of various 
other considerations besides market viability to enter into research and 
development policy decisons. 
A more straightforward question of market viability involved the Barn- 
well Fuel Reprocessing Facility. In a decision consistent with the proven 
nature of reprocessing technology, the Administration recommended no funds 
for Barnwell, while lifting the Carter Administration's ban on commercial re- 
processing. However, given the current ample supply of uranium, the private 
sector has shown little interest in reprocessing unless the Federal Government 
can guarantee a market for the plutonium. 
The Administration's support for nuclear is evident in its recently 
released nuclear policy statement. Besides supporting CRBR and commercial 
reprocessing, the Administration reiterated its support for the light-water 
reactor program stating: "one of the best potential sources of new electrical 
energy supplies in the coming decades is nuclear power." Besides protecting 
the various parts of the DOE fission budget from cuts, the Administration 
limits Federal actions favoring commercial nuclear power to two: economic 
recovery to "improve the climate for capital formation" through tax incentives 
and fiscal restraint, and elimination of "regulatory burdens." Beyond those 
steps, the President's nuclear statement offers a study and a report in a 
year on "obstacles which stand in the way of increased use of nuclear energy 
and steps needed to overcome themw--and an implict halt on negative rhetoric 
regarding nuclear safety and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. 
In his policy statement, the President states: 
... the federal government has created a regulatory environment 
that is forcing many utilities to rule out nuclear power as a 
source of new generating capacity, even when their consumers may 
face unnecessarily high electric rates as a result, Nuclear power 
has become entangled in a morass of regulations that do not enhance 
safety but that do cause extensive licensing delays and economic 
uncertainty. 281 
However, a major cause for the delay in nuclear power plant construction is 
the drop in electricity demand due to increasing electricity prices coupled 
with a slowing economy. Future electricity demand is uncertain, leaving fi- 
nancially strapped utilities in a bind. Do the utilities proceed to increase 
capacity, assuming elecricity demand will return to historic levels? Or do 
they assume demand will remain restrained and rely on alternatives which may 
be inefficient if demand does return to historic levels? A decision to in- 
crease capacity through a nuclear or fossil fuel plant requires a significant 
long-term investment. If demand does not increase to ensure economic use 
of the added capacity, the utility still has to cover its investment. Given 
the current economic situation, utilities are finding this difficult to do. 
The President's nuclear statement maintains that relieving regulatory 
burdens on the industry and providing moral support is insufficient to revital- 
ize the nuclear option. As stated by the President: "Eliminating the regula- 
tory problems that have burdened nuclear power will be of little use if the 
utility sector cannot raise the capital necessary to fund construction of 
new generating facilities." To improve the climate for nuclear power, the 
Administration believes it must improve the general economic situation. A 
growing economy generating increased electricity demand is considered essen- 
tial to a revitalized nuclear industry. Unless the Administration's eco- 
nomic policies can achieve this, the Administration fears its support for 
the nuclear option will have limited impact. 
281 President Reagan. Nuclear Policy Statement. October 8, 1981. -

CONSERVATION 
Conservation and solar energy development were primary tenets of 
the Carter Administration's energy policy. Support for this emphasis was 
evident by the public hearings on NEP 111 held by the Reagan Administration. 
As summarized by DOE, conservation was "clearly the major theme" of the Bos- 
ton hearings, and speakers were "vitually unanimous" in favor of Government- 
supported conservation programs at the Atlanta hearings. DOE was accused 
of promoting synthetic fuels and nuclear while ignoring conservation. c/ 
Despite these comments on the draft NEP 111, the final NEP I11 contains 
little regarding conservation. Less than one-tenth of the report discusses 
conservation's role in the Reagan energy policy. The report states the 
Administration's belief that rising energy costs will be sufficient incentive 
to promote conservation without active Government assistance. Price and tax 
credits are the mechanisms the Administration believes will promote conser- 
vation, not Government programs. 
The Administration recognizes that price and tax credit mechanisms will 
not help the poor cope with higher energy prices, but feels such suffering 
must be considered in the context of overall social and economic policy, not 
energy policy. The Reagan Administration believes a growing economy is the 
best way to help the poor--"a rising tide which will raise all the boats." 
However, the time at which the tide will come and its height are unknown. 
Given the Reagan Administration's cuts in energy programs to assist low income 
families, the answer to these questions are critical in determining how much 
suffering the poor will have to endure. 
29/ See Capital Energy Letter, May 4, 1981. p. 3. -
Consisted with this philosophy of limited Government assistance for 
conservation, the Reagan Administration has recommended significant reductions 
in all conservation programs; reductions to which the Congress has partially 
agreed. All three categories of conservation programs--research and development 
regulation, and grant programs--have been reduced. Reflecting the philosophy 
that Government research and development should focus on longterm needs, the 
Administration recommended termination of several research and development 
projects on the premise they should stand the test of market viability with- 
out Government assistance. These included urban waste, consumer products, 
advanced automotive engine design, and industrial processes projects. In the 
Reconciliation Act, the Congress agreed to reduce but not terminate these 
research and development programs. The Congress doubled the Administration 
request for conservation research and development programs from $86 million 
to $182 million. However, this is still a significant decrease from the 1981 
funding level of $290 million. 
Regulatory programs for building energy performance standards, appliance 
efficiency standards, and utility conservation services, are not great burdens 
on the DOE budget. However, reflecting its belief in deregulation, the Admin- 
istration called for the termination of these programs, arguing that these 
programs impose too great a burden on private industry. In the Reconciliation 
Act, the Congress authorized $40 million to continue these programs. However, 
the Congress also agreed to make the proposed building energy performance 
standards voluntary rather than mandatory. 
Finally, DOE conservation grant programs to States and local communities 
have also been cut. In his original budget request, the President recommended 
terminating funding for State energy offices and outreach programs, reducing 
support for the schools and hospitals program ($100 million), and incorpor- 
ating DOE'S weatherization program for low-income people into the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development community development block grant program. 
These recommendations met with significant resistance in the Congress which 
wished to retain funding for these programs. In the Reconciliation Act, the 
Congress authorized $336 million to fund these various programs and recommended 
that they all continue. 
In recognition of this congressional support, the Administration in July 
1981 backtracked from its original position. Faced with an attempt to reauthor- 
ized all DOE catagorical grant programs (S.1166), the Administration introduced 
a counterproposal entitled the "State and Local Energy Block Grant Act of 1981." 
(S. 1544). As stated by OMB Director Stockman: 
... Under these circumstances,[reconciliation funding for grant 
programs] in a spirit of compromise, the Administration would not 
oppose legislation authorizing a State and Local Energy Block 
Grant for energy supply, conservation, and low-income weatherization 
activities which would repeal and replace all the existing cate- 
gorical conservation grant programs, including the Residential 
Conservation Service, and for which funding would be authorized 
at a level not in excess of $200 million per year. 301 
This proposal may not satisfy supporters of Government conservation programs 
because of its inclusion of energy supply into the areas eligible for funding, 
the funding level which is one-half that suggested for S. 1166, and the refusal 
of the Administration to support appropriations for it. 
In summary, the President has achieved a significant reduction in Govern- 
ment support for energy conservation programs, although not complete elimin- 
ation of them. That he has been unable to achieve more cuts in conservation 
30 / Letter from David Stockman to Senator McClure. Printed in Congressional 
~ecord, July 30, 1981, p. S8862. 
programs reflects a strong congressional consensus on the importance of con- 
servation, and the belief that Government assistance is necessary to achieve 
the maximum benefits from conservation opportunities. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
As the Reagan Administration has moved to reverse the direction of the 
Nation's energy policies, it has also rejected and proposed to dismantle 
the major symbol the previous Administration's energy policy--the Department 
of Energy (DOE). The DOE was the cornerstone of the   at ion's energy policy in 
1977 when it was established, and occupied a central role in the formulation 
and implementation of that policy throughout the Carter Administration. How- 
ever, Presient Reagan campaigned on a promise to abolish it, and announced 
on September 24, 1981, that he would soon propose legislation to disband the 
Department. The intention to disband DOE was announced as one of several 
budget cutting and moneysaving measures; however, the move is seen by some 
as largely symbolic, since little money would be saved by abolishing the De- 
partment that could not be saved by simply cutting the DOE budget. 
Following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the Nation's energy problems 
were perceived as increasingly critical, and accordingly, higher levels 
of organizational focus were sought to deal with them. When DOE was 
established, both Congress and the President expressed confidence that 
the new Energy Department would be an important advancement in shaping 
more effective national energy policies. However, the pressures under 
which DOE operated in its first three and a half years of existence made 
the formulation of widely agreed upon policies difficult, and left DOE 
with few defenders. It had consistently been in the middle of contending 
and competing groups, and failed to fully satisfy any of its constituencies. 
The absence of critical energy shortages since 1979 has contributed 
to the fading sense of urgency concerning the Federal role in energy. By 
1980, President Carter no longer pointed with his earlier pride to the 
establishment of DOE as a major accomplishment; President Reagan promised 
to abolish it. 
In describing "the Federal role", NEP I11 failed to mention the Depart- 
ment of Energy at all, and made the Interior Department the central Federal 
actor. The plan stated: 
"The Federal Government's most direct impact on America's energy 
future arises from its poisition as the steward of the Outer 
Continental Shelf and of 762 million acres of publicly controlled 
land, one-third of the land area of the United States....The Fed- 
eral role in national energy production is to bring these resources 
into the energy marketplace, while simultaneously protecting the 
environment." 311 
Finally, on September 24, 1981, President Reagan addressed the 
Nation on the economic recovery plan of his Administration, and proposed dis- 
mantling of the Departments of Energy and Education as a key move in reducing 
the size of Government. He stated: 
"...we propose to dismantle two Cabinet departments, Energy and 
Education. Both Secretaries are wholly in accord with this. 
Some of the activities in both of these departments will, of 
course, be continued either independently or in other areas of 
government .... Now, we don't need an Energy Department to solve 
our basic energy problem. As long as we let the forces of the 
marketplace work without undue interference, the ingenuity of 
consumers, business, producers and inventors will do that for us." 321 -
The Administration had indicated that a proposal to disband the Depart- 
ment--an action which would require an Act of Congress--would be forwarded 
to Congress by mid-November or early December 1981. However, few specifics 
about the proposal have been circulated. Discussion to date has centered 
31/ U.S. Department of Energy. Securing America's Energy Future: The 
~ a t i o z l  Energy Policy Plan. July, 1981. p. 1 
321 President's Address to the Nation, September 24, 1981. Statement 
released by the White House, p. 5. 
around where the various functions previously housed in the Department 
of Energy would be transferred. An early Presidential decision paper indi- 
cated that only the Secretary's Office, the Economic Regulatory Administration, 
and certain energy conservation grant programs would be abolished outright; 
other programs would continue, often in reduced form, in other agencies. The 
programs of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, formerly the Federal 
Power Commission, were expected to revert to the old format in an independent 
regulatory agency; the nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research and develop 
ment programs were similarly suggested for a new, independent agency, perhaps 
much like the old Atomic Energy Commission; other programs would be transferred 
to other departments, such as Interior, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, 
and Transportation, or to agencies such as the National Science Foundation, 
or Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
Although a number of reasons for dismantling the Department of Energy 
are offered as a rationale, the majo reason for President Reagan's interest 
in such a proposal is his perception that "...we don't need an Energy Depart- 
ment to solve our basic energy problem ... the forces of the marketplace ... the 
ingenuity of consumers, business, producers and inventors will do that for 
us." The Department is a symbol of a Federal role in managing energy supply 
and demand that President Reagan rejects. Since he would prefer to minimize 
the Federal role in energy affairs, he would also like to dismantle and remove 
the major symbol and reminder of the energy policies of his predecessor--poli- 
cies that centered on Federal actions. The existence of a major Cabinet Depart- 
ment on energy is likely to continue attracting interest in what the Federal 
Government can or should do--in energy conservation, in energy research, in 
energy information, and in other areas. Most of these are areas where funding 
has been cut back or eliminated, but the continued existence of the DOE is 
both a reminder that broader involvement is possible, and a magnet for new 
proposals in the areas the President believes should be left to the private 
sector. 
However, those who favor retaining the Department argue that the W E  
is indeed an appropriate grouping of functions of central importance to 
the U.S. economy and the well-being of its citizens, and should continue 
at a high level of visibility and concern in the Federal Government. Also, 
most other governments, both in the States and in other countries, have en- 
ergy departments or ministries, and proponents of keeping a U.S Energy Depart- 
ment argue that the U.S. Government should have a similar entity to interact 
with these in dealing with energy issues. In addition, there is concern that 
in the event of a possible future energy crisis, the Energy Department would 
be needed, but that after disbanding it, it would be extremely difficult to 
re-establish it. 
In general, at present there is considerable conern among chairmen of 
energy-related committees in Congress over a precipitous move to abolish DOE. 
The earlier assumption that Congress would speedily enact the necesssary leg- 
islation to disband the Department if the Administration requested it, is 
now more widely questioned. However, proponents of disbanding the Department 
have been critical of DOE for some time. The debate over keeping it or dispen- 
sing with it is likely to be lively, not only on organizational points, but 
as a symbol of the level of acceptance in Congress of the overall thrust of 
the Reagan ~dministration's energy program. 
The Reagan Administration's energy program represents the latest in a 
series of attempts to seek a philosophical base for rationalizing a national 
energy policy. In returning to the premise that governed energy policy be- 
fore the embargo of 1973-4--minimal Federal involvement in energy decision- 
making--the Administration is repudiating the essence of Federal energy pol- 
icies since the embargo. Essentially, the Reagan Administration is saying 
that the viability of the energy market mechanism was not fundamentally 
changed by the embargo or subsequent disruption; Government intervention in 
the marketplace was an inappropriate response to the problem, and more im- 
portant, compounded the Nation's energy problems. 
In contrast to the energy policy articulated by the previous Administra- 
tion, the Reagan Administration's energy policy is governed by a philosophical 
return to a major reliance on market mechanisms to meet current and future 
developments. President Carter's National Energy Plan was premised on projec- 
tions that world demand for petroleum would exceed supply in 1985, thus disrup- 
ting world markets. This lent an international context to what had been per- 
ceived as primarily a domestic issue. The Reagan program does not globalize 
national energy policy, nor has it been premised upon traditional decision-making 
methods such as cost-benefit analysis. 
With the exception of Federal support for nuclear and some synthetic fuels, 
the Reagan energy policy is based instead upon a belief in the ability of pri- 
vate enterprise and the market to supply the country with sufficient and appro- 
priate forms of energy to maintain healthy growth at prices affordable by insti- 
tutions and individuals. The question that remains is whether such a system, 
based on market allocation, can provide the country's energy needs at prices 
that are polictically equitable and economically affordable, and whether the 
international climate will permit the market to do so. 
